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I agree with a great deal in Helen’s paper.1 I am especially sympathetic to her 
suggestion that we gain metaphysical illumination by considering various ways 
in which we arrive at ideas of certain kinds of individuals by abstraction from 
those of more basic kinds. My aim is to pursue that suggestion in exploration of 
the proposal that a grounding node in this process of abstraction may be 
characterized by Exclusivity in spatial location. 
 
§ 1 Stout, Steward, and Exclusivity 
 
Stout argues that since processes are like enduring substances and unlike events 
in that they undergo change, we should think of processes as like such 
substances in not having temporal extension or parts (forthcoming).2 Steward 
endorses the idea that individual processes undergo change; but she insists that 
Stout’s conclusion is inconsistent with the correct articulation of the shared 
occurrent nature of processes and events precisely in terms of their being 
distinguished from enduring substances in having temporal extension and parts. 
                                                        
1 My reference to Steward throughout is to her paper here (2015). Since its use is 
contested and can be confusing in this context, I avoid the term ‘continuant’. 
2 Like both Steward and Stout, I assume throughout that substances endure 
rather than persisting by perdurance. 
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She concludes that processes are interestingly intermediate between enduring 
substances and events. They primarily have their properties, not at times, like 
substances, or atemporally, like events, but between times, although harmless 
idealization allows the ascription of certain properties at times within periods 
over which they primarily have such properties. They are therefore precisely a 
counterexample to Stout’s inference from undergoing change to not having 
temporal extension or parts. 
 
This all seems right to me. My question is how these categories interact with the 
idea of a unified class of Exclusive Individuals (EI’s), persisting things, any pair of 
which necessarily meet the following condition: if there is any time at which o 
and o* are precisely colocated, then o=o*. In other words, no two distinct 
Exclusive Individuals are ever precisely colocated. One way to approach the role 
of Exclusivity is via Helen’s diagram concerning two modes of abstraction in 
cases of change: leading to an event that is that change, on the one hand, or to the 
process of something’s changing, on the other. The proposal that I consider here 
is that Exclusive Individuals lie at the ultimate apex of that triangle. 
 
Events and processes are occurrents. As Steward rightly insists against Stout, the 
correct way to register this fact is in terms of the idea that events and processes 
have temporal extension and temporal parts. Hence the location of any 
temporally extended event/process at a given time is precisely the location of a 
proper temporal part of that event/process that is also a temporal part of 
distinct events/processes that are more, or less, extended in time than the 
original event/process. Thus, events and processes fail Exclusivity. There are 
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distinct temporally extended such occurrents, o and o* that are precisely 
colocated at certain times. Consider, for example, the event of the Philharmonia’s 
performance of Beethoven 3 on a specific occasion. Its spatial location five 
minutes into the performance is precisely that of the distinct event of their 
performance of its first movement on that occasion. Hence Exclusivity fails. 
Similarly, in the case of processes, consider the dripping of Helen’s tap 
throughout the whole Christmas period. Its location at noon on Christmas Day is 
precisely that of the distinct process of its dripping throughout Christmas Day. 
Again, Exclusivity fails.3  
 
Another kind of case threatens Exclusivity even in the domain of substances, 
putting pressure on the idea that there is any unified class of EI’s at all. The 
standard example concerns a clay statue. Suppose that a lump of clay is detached 
from a large block and some time later fashioned into a person-shaped statue 
that might be squashed back into a ball in sculptural dissatisfaction shortly 
thereafter. The statue stands before me now: call it ‘Goliath’. The lump is before 
me too: call it ‘Lumpl’. Lumpl existed prior to any sculptural intervention, and 
would remain after any subsequent squashing. It is often said that Goliath did 
not exist prior to sculpting, and would not exist after squashing. For there was, 
and would be, no statue there then. In that case, Goliath and Lumpl are distinct 
yet precisely located before me now. On the assumption that Lumpl and Goliath 
                                                        
3 Likewise, four-dimensional perdurants fail the Exclusivity condition as 
intended. For, in the sense in which there is one persisting such thing in a certain 
location at a given time, there are many that all share the temporal part that is 
more strictly there then. The evaluation of Exclusivity on the Stage View (see e.g. 
Sider, 2001), and what to make of it from the perspective that I explore here, is a 
more complex matter for another occasion. 
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are both substances, then they constitute a counterexample to Exclusivity for 
that category of individuals. 
 
I argue in § 2 that this is a mistake. There is a unified class of Exclusive 
Individuals containing the familiar substances; and we can understand these as 
fundamental to our worldly ontology in the following sense: we understand the 
nature of other individuals by various modes of abstraction from the substantial 
EI’s upon which they are grounded. 
 
§ 2 Exclusivity v Colocation 
 
Here is an alternative view of the of Lumpl/Goliath case. Lumpl is a substance 
existing throughout. It came into existence when detached from the large block, 
and will be destroyed, let us say, when the statue, or squashed ball, is broken up. 
Its shape was slowly, deliberately, painstakingly, transformed by the sculptor in 
accordance with her evolving aesthetic-representational project. Eventually, as 
the intentional accomplishment of that plan, it took on the shape of a human 
person. Lumpl therefore became a statue. So, insofar as ‘Goliath’ names the 
substance before me that satisfies the predicate ‘x is a statue’, the statue itself, 
then Goliath=Lumpl. The error in what is often said is to infer from the fact there 
was no statue prior to sculpting, and the fact that there would be no statue after 
squashing, that the substance before me now that is a statue, namely Goliath, did 
not, or would not, exist then. That inference is essential to the argument against 
Exclusivity; yet it may be denied. For Goliath, AKA Lumpl, existed before it 
became a statue, and would exist after it ceased to be a statue if it were simply 
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squashed into a ball. Hence this case is no counterexample to the Exclusivity of 
such substances. 
 
Before reflecting further on the relative merits of this alternative view of the 
case, it would be helpful to clarify which familiar substances are supposed to be 
amongst the EI’s. This is something that is susceptible to reconsideration and 
revision as we accumulate relevant empirical and theoretical evidence; but here 
are some candidates that I would currently propose. First, there are naturally 
occurring things, such as a cat that is conceived, grows inside its mother and is 
born, lives an active life, perhaps loosing a tail on the way, dies, and eventually 
disintegrates by decomposition; or an acorn that falls from an oak, sprouts in the 
ground, and grows to become a grand old oak that is finally destroyed by loggers; 
or a rock that detaches and falls from a cliff, gradually eroding to become a small 
pebble, and perhaps even a grain of sand on the beach, before vanishing 
altogether. Second, there are human-made EI’s, such as a lump of clay created by 
being torn en masse from a large block, shaped gradually over time into a statue, 
squashed back into a ball, left to dry out and eventually broken up into tiny 
pieces with a sledge hammer; or a coin, minted and much used, discarded out of 
circulation, battered and bent, used as tool to open tins, and winding up in a 
museum collection, before finally melting away in a fire. 
 
How, then, should we assess the alternative that I offered above to the view of 
Lumpl/Goliath-type cases as counterexamples to Exclusivity within the domain 
of substances? Both sides agree that Lumpl and Goliath exist precisely colocated 
before me now. The opponent of Exclusivity (the anti-Exclusivist) argues that 
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they are distinct, since Lumpl also existed, and would do so, at times that Goliath 
did not, and would not. The proponent of Exclusivity (the Exclusivist) insists 
instead that Goliath just is (numerically identical to) Lumpl, named ‘Goliath’ 
when it comes to be person-shaped, and hence that Goliath likewise existed, and 
would do so, at these other times too. 
 
A first question is how widespread this phenomenon of distinct but precisely 
colocated substances is supposed to be. The template for producing cases 
numerically distinguishes artefacts, in a very broad sense, including at least 
aesthetic and functional artefacts, from the material substances that at some 
time constitute them: Goliath and Lumpl, respectively, in our familiar example.4 
Since one may deliberately form lumps or pieces of all sorts of stuff, and indeed 
even animals, into such aesthetic or functional artefacts, the template apparently 
applies quite generally. For example, a piece of metal, Mike, may be shaped in 
order to open tins, producing a tin-opener, Tinny; a piece of plastic, Pat, may be 
heated and reshaped in order to serve as a replacement button on a coat, Tony; a 
dog, Rex, may even be trained to adopt a specific pose in which it is displayed for 
a few hours only as living art-work, Art. In each case the question arises: is 
Tinny/Tony/Art distinct from but constituted by Mike/Pat/Rex, or is 
Tinny/Tony/Art instead identical to Mike/Pat/Rex? Certainly there was no tin-
opener/button/art-work around before the relevant purposive intervention. 
Should we infer that Tinny/Tony/Art did not exist then and so must be distinct 
                                                        
4 I follow Wiggins (1968, 2001) in using ‘constitution’ to name the proposed 
asymmetric relation between distinct colocated substances in such cases. Others 
endorsing the anti-Exclusivist view include Johnston (1992), Baker (1997), 
Thompson (1998), and Fine (2003, 2008). 
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from Mike/Pat/Rex. Or should we insist instead that Tinny/Tony/Art just is 
Mike/Pat/Rex, and existed before it became a tin-opener/button/art-work and 
acquired its second name? A little imagination generates similar questions in 
relation to very many, if not all, familiar substances. So the debate between 
opponents and proponents of Exclusivity in such cases is fundamental to the 
evaluation of the idea that there is any unified class of EI’s. 
 
A preliminary point to make in adjudicating this disagreement is that the 
Exclusivist’s identity claim is always available at least in principle. So the 
argument offered above for the distinctness of artefact and constituting material 
substance is inconclusive as it stands. The anti-Exclusivist’s case depends on a 
principled reason to reject the identification. But why should we reject the 
Exclusivist’s claim that the substance before me now that is a statue, Goliath, is 
the currently person-shaped lump of clay there, Lumpl? Well, Lumpl existed 
when there was no statue there and would continue to do so if there ceased to be 
one. So the identification entails that Goliath did, and would, exist in those 
circumstances. Hence it depends upon the idea that the statue before me now is 
only accidentally a statue. Yet the anti-Exclusivist in question here is an 
essentialist, endorsing the thesis that any substance that is a statue is essentially 
a statue. This essentialism constitutes a principled reason to reject the 
Exclusivist’s identification of colocated substances. 
 
So what is to be said in defence of the anti-Exclusivist’s essentialism? One 
suggestion is that this is required if artefacts are to have determinate persistence 
conditions, and this in turn is a necessary condition on their status as individual 
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substances (Wiggins, esp. 2012). But, whatever the merits of these ideas in 
general, the two conjuncts of this suggestion are inconsistent in the current 
dialectical context. For suppose that individual substances do necessarily have 
determinate persistence conditions. It is crucial to the anti-Exclusivist’s use of 
the example of Goliath and Lumpl that both are individual substances that 
therefore have determinate persistence conditions. The Exclusivist identifies 
Goliath with Lumpl and so gives Goliath precisely the determinate persistence 
conditions of Lumpl. Yet the Exclusivist rejects the relevant form of essentialism: 
the statue Goliath is only accidentally a statue. Hence the contested essentialism 
is not required if artefacts like statues are to have determinate persistence 
conditions. There is no motivation here for the anti-Exclusivist’s essentialism.5 
 
Instead, the idea must be that the persistence conditions given by the Exclusivist 
for artefacts like statues are incorrect: the contested essentialism is required to 
give such things the correct persistence conditions, rather than to give them any 
determinate persistence conditions at all. The anti-Exclusivist argument set out 
above offers an example that might be supposed to establish this, in which it is 
said that there are times at which Lumpl did exist, and would exist, at which 
Goliath did not, and would not. This is in opposition to the Exclusivist’s 
insistence that the persistence conditions for Goliath are precisely those of 
Lumpl. The problem is that the ground for saying that Goliath did not, and would 
not, exist then is precisely the essentialist thesis under contention. That is to say, 
                                                        
5 The issue for the Exclusivist of how to ensure that proposed EI’s such as Lumpl 
have determinate persistence conditions in the sense required for their status as 
genuine individual substances is not straightforward. It is particularly pressing 
in connection with their loss and gain of parts. For a discussion of some of the 
problems and possibilities here, see my (forthcoming). 
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essentialism is assumed in claiming that Goliath begins to exist only during, or at 
the end of, the sculpting process, and would cease to exist if the sculptor 
squashed the statue in dissatisfaction with her work. Again, there is no 
independent motivation here. 
 
It is true that we may find it odd to say some of the things about this case that the 
Exclusivist regards as true. For example, pointing at Goliath, ‘that statue was 
lying in the corner of the studio a year ago (when Lumpl had just been detached 
from the large block of clay and the sculptor had not even started her work)’, or, 
pointing at an undistinguished ball of clay a week from now, ‘this is the beautiful 
statue that I saw last week’. But there is a relatively straightforward explanation 
of the oddness of saying such things consistent with their truth. In the first case, 
the truth is that the substance that is a statue before me now lay in the corner of 
the studio a year ago before it became a statue. The oddness lies in the false 
implicature, carried by referring to it specifically as the statue that it now is, that 
it was already a statue then. In the second case, the truth is that the beautiful 
statue that I saw last week and this undistinguished ball are one and the same 
substance. The oddness lies in the false implicature that it is still a beautiful 
statue, carried again by referring to it as the beautiful statue that I saw last week. 
The same combination of oddness and truth arises in connection with the 
following cases where I take it that the alalogue of the Exclusivist’s position is 
also endorsed by anti-Exclusivists in connection with Goliath/Lumpl. Pointing at 
Heston Blumenthal, I say ‘that great chef once cooked for me’ or, pointing at a 
rather decrepit ex-footballer, ‘this is my mother’s pin-up’. There are false 
implicatures that Heston was already a great chef when he cooked for me – in 
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fact he may have been hopeless and the meal a disaster – and that the person 
before me still personifies my mother’s ideals of male beauty. Yet these are no 
reason to deny the numerical identities of Heston with the man who cooked for 
me and of the ex-footballer with the man whose pictures my mother adored. 
 
Similar points apply against a more direct approach sometimes taken by 
opponents of Exclusivism. Modifying a case of Wiggins’ (2012, p. 9), for example, 
we may say that the statue, Goliath, was made by the sculptor, whereas the lump 
of clay, Lumpl, was not. Does it not immediately follow that Goliath and Lumpl 
are distinct? Well it certainly would if the truth of what we say entailed that 
Goliath has a property that Lumpl does not, namely the property of being 
brought into existence by the sculptor. According to the Exclusivist, though, if the 
sculptor detached Lumpl from the large block of clay herself, then she thereby 
brought Goliath into existence, although before it was shaped into a statue, as 
she did Lumpl. For they are one and the same. If she did not detach the lump 
herself, then she brought neither into existence. Still, what we mean when we say 
that she made Goliath is that she made Lumpl into a statue; and she may 
certainly have done that even if she did not herself bring Lumpl into existence. 
But that is perfectly consistent with their identity. Likewise, we may say, looking 
at Viktoria Mullova, ‘that violinist was made by Leonid Kogan at the Moscow 
conservatoire’, even though Kogan did not bring the woman before us into 
existence, without denying that that woman is the great violinist: a property she 
acquired through Kogan’s teaching in Moscow. Again, we could bolster the 
Leibniz Law strategy by insisting that statues are essentially statues, and so 
inferring from the fact that our sculptor brought it about that there is a statue 
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now before me that she really did bring that substance, Goliath, into existence in 
the sense in which she did not bring Lumpl into existence if it was detached from 
the large bock by her assistant instead. But this appeal to essentialism just takes 
us back round the now familiar circle. 
 
So the anti-Exclusivist’s case so far crucially depends upon, and provides no 
independent support for, the disputed form of essentialism. In considering 
whether there are really conditions in which Lumpl existed, or would exist, in the 
absence of Goliath, we have reached something of a stand-off. 
 
In § 3 I consider an alternative argument for the claim that the Exclusivist is 
unable to give the correct persistence conditions for artefacts of the kinds in 
question: there are apparently conditions in which Goliath may persist in the 
absence of its currently constituting material substance Lumpl. But evaluating 
this argument requires more stage-setting. 
 
An important virtue of Exclusivism is that its proponents are in a position to 
offer a kind of concession to anti-Exclusivist opponents. So far we have been 
envisaging the term ‘Goliath’ being used to pick out the persisting material 
substance before me now that is a statue: according to the Exclusivist, this is 
Lumpl. Instead, though, we may decide to use the term ‘Goliath’ to name a quite 
different kind of individual that is grounded upon Lumpl by a form of 
abstraction: Lumpl’s being a statue. Steward’s discussion of the abstraction 
involved in our recognition of various processes, such as the dripping of a tap, 
provides a model by which we might understand this suggestion, and why it 
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constitutes a kind of concession to the anti-Exclusivist, although one that might 
equally be described as a diagnosis of their error. 
 
Whilst a tap is dripping, we may abstract to form the idea of an individual 
occurrent, the process that it is thereby undergoing, namely the dripping of that 
tap. Similarly, the Exclusivist might say, whilst a lump of clay, Lumpl, is a statue, 
we may likewise abstract to form the idea of an individual occurrent, the process 
that it is thereby undergoing, namely Lumpl’s being a statue. We may then, if we 
wish, use the name ‘Goliath’ to name that individual process. To avoid confusion, 
I distinguish two names in what follows, ‘Goliaths’ and ‘Goliathp’, for the 
substance that is a statue (Lumpl, according to the Exclusivist) and the process of 
that thing’s being a statue, respectively, instead of attempting to keep apart two 
distinct uses of the same name, ‘Goliath’.6 
 
So Goliathp is the process of Lumpl’s being a statue: the being a statue of Lumpl. 
It is therefore essentially something’s being a statue, just as the dripping of a tap 
is essentially a dripping. Before the tap in question started dripping, and were it 
shortly to be fixed, there was, and would be, no dripping of that tap, and – here 
the inference is valid – that dripping of the tap did not and would not exist. 
Similarly, before Lumpl became a statue, and if it were to cease to be one, 
Goliathp did not, and would not, exist. Thus, Goliathp has the persistence 
                                                        
6 It is true that Goliathp is not much of a changing, as Steward characterizes 
processes. It is rather an unchanging; but still, I claim, it is an unfolding process 
of Lumpl’s remaining a statue: things are going on over time in virtue of which 
this is the case. One may quarrel about the term ‘process’ here, although I will 
continue to use it. The crucial point is that Goliathp is a perduring individual 
grounded on Goliaths by a kind of abstraction. 
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conditions that anti-Exclusivists wish to force on Goliaths at least in connection 
with the example as described so far. Yet this constitutes no counterexample to 
Exclusivity within the domain of substances. For Goliathp is not an enduring 
substance at all, but a perduring occurrent process grounded upon the enduring 
substance, Lumpl. 
 
The Exclusivist’s concession, then, is to admit that there is something that 
behaves very much as anti-Exclusivists take Goliaths to behave, namely Goliathp. 
But the concession is harmless. For the two must be distinguished; and 
Exclusivity holds in the domain of substances. Indeed, this might better be 
described as a diagnosis of anti-Exclusivist error than as a genuine concession. 
The anti-Exclusivist mistakes a process that is essentially something’s being a 
statue for a distinct substance precisely colocated with Lumpl. Goliaths is a 
substance that is only accidentally a statue and Goliathp is essentially 
something’s being a statue. The latter is not a distinct substance. It is not a 
substance at all, but a kind of process grounded upon Lumpl, which we 
understand by abstraction from the fact that Lumpl itself is a sometime statue. 
Substances may have essential properties. But these are not created simply by 
our attention to some of the ways that they happen to be. 
 
§ 3 Collection 
 
The argument against Exclusivity that we have been considering so far concerns 
conditions in which Lumpl supposedly exists, or would exist, in the absence of 
Goliath. In the present section I consider an alternative argument for the claim 
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that the Exclusivist is unable to give the correct persistence conditions for 
artefacts of like statues from the possibility of conditions in which Goliath 
supposedly persists in the absence of its currently constituting material 
substance Lumpl. I set the stage for that argument and its assessment by 
considering the Exclusivist interpretation of a related case. 
 
Suppose that I have a note of currency in my hand from an economic system in 
which payment with paper money is possible if and only if the single serial 
number on the bottom left-hand corner of the front face is legible. Call it ‘Note’. 
Now suppose that the front bottom left-hand corner of Note gets wet. The ink 
runs and the serial number becomes illegible. By analogy with the Exclusivist 
account of Lumpl/Goliath above, although I no longer have a valid unit of 
currency in my hand, the substance that previously satisfied the predicate ‘x is a 
unit of currency’, Notes, is still there, although it no longer satisfies that 
predicate. We may also identify a distinct individual, the process of Note’s being 
a unit of currency, Notep, grounded upon Notes. This is essentially something’s 
being a unit of currency, and it does not survive Notes getting wet. There is no 
counterexample to Exclusivity in the domain of substances, though. 
 
Suppose now that, in order to keep the economy stable, a new note is printed 
with the serial number previously on Notes. Call this ‘Replacements’. 
Replacements is a substantial unit of currency: a substance satisfying the 
predicate ‘x is a unit of currency’. It is likely qualitatively indistinguishable from 
Notes before the wetting; but of course Replacements and Notes are numerically 
distinct. There is also the process of Replacements’s being a unit of currency, 
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Replacementp. And we may, if we wish, consider a composite individual 
consisting of Notep followed by Replacementp. But this does not bring into 
existence, still less recognize as anyway present, an enduring substance, 
‘Currencys’, say, previously constituted by Notes and now constituted by 
Replacements, just as the forthcoming election of Ed Miliband will not bring into 
existence, or draw our attention to, an individual substance ‘Prime Minister’ 
currently constituted by David Cameron and subsequently constituted by Ed 
Miliband. It does not follow from the fact that there is a trajectory of processes, 
all of which are instances of something’s being F, for some property F that we 
care about deeply, that there is an individual enduring substance that is 
essentially F and follows precisely that trajectory. 
 
Similar points apply, according to the Exclusivist, in the following modified case. 
Instead of getting wet, Notes looses a tiny corner. Sadly, this happens to be the 
front bottom left-hand corner containing the serial number. So Notes, now very 
slightly smaller, survives but ceases to be a unit of currency and Notep is 
terminated. There is no need to print a new note, though. The tiny fragment of 
paper that was created by Notes loosing a corner contains a legible serial 
number. So this is a replacement small but substantial unit of currency, 
Replacements. Notes can no longer be used to pay for goods, Replacements can. If 
this in turn gets wet, then it ceases to satisfy the predicate ‘x is a unit of currency’ 
and Replacementp is terminated; a new note, Replacement*, has to be printed. 
Once again, the property of being a unit of currency is passed between distinct 
substances, Notes, Replacements, and Replacement*s (as the property of being 
Prime Minister will be passed from Cameron to Miliband); there are likewise 
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three distinct processes of each of these in turn being a unit of currency, Notep, 
Replacementp and Replacement’p; there is no further substance, distinct from 
Notes, Replacements, and Replacement’s, yet colocated with and constituted by 
each of these in turn. 
 
Now let us return to Goliath/Lumpl. The anti-Exclusivist contention is that the 
Exclusivist is bound to give Goliaths incorrect persistence conditions; for there 
are conditions under which Goliaths persists in the absence its currently 
constituting Lumpl, which the Exclusivist mistakenly identifies Goliaths with. For 
suppose that Goliath looses its nose, which has to be replaced, then an arm, and 
finally its whole lower body, each in turn replaced by duplicates. Surely, it is said, 
Goliaths remains, but Lumpl is no more. Hence Goliaths≠Lumpl and Exclusivity 
fails in the domain of substances. The case has many variations; but I offer a 
series of suggestions for an adequate Exclusivist response. 
 
Each successive operation consists of a subtraction followed by an addition. The 
subtraction may be gradual and minor, the nose worn down over years of 
viewers’ rubbing, say, or sudden and major, as the whole lower body drops off 
due to splitting at the waist; and the addition may be ‘homogeneous’, by clay 
built up and integrated with the noseless face, or ‘heterogeneous’, by a hastily 
cast concrete replacement lower body, say.7 So there are a number of 
possibilities. Lumpl may either survive or be destroyed by the subtraction. If 
                                                        
7 I use these terms as shorthand to distinguish adding to a substance in such a 
way as to increase its size, on the one hand, from attaching a distinct substance 
to it thereby producing a mere composite of two distinct substances, on the 
other. The principles governing this distinction are non-trivial; but all parties to 
the current dispute accept its existence. 
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Lumpl is destroyed, by division in half at the waist, say, then Goliaths is no more. 
What is created by the addition is either a new homogeneous lump of clay that is 
accidentally a statue qualitatively identical to but numerically distinct from 
Goliaths, along the lines of the Replacementss in the Note case above, or some 
kind of heterogeneous composite that is not a unified substance at all: a lump of 
clay attached to a lump of concrete.8 We may think of the resulting composite as 
a ‘statue’; but this is like thinking of Gilbert and George as a statue. It neither 
creates nor recognizes the prior existence of any individual substance. Suppose 
instead that Lumpl survives, through the gradual rubbing down of its nose, say. 
Is it still a statue? Very plausibly yes in this case; but probably not if the gradual 
rubbing down were more significant over a longer period and Lumpl’s shape 
were no longer recognizably human. I take these two cases in turn. In the first 
case, Goliaths remains, noseless, and Goliathp continues. If the addition is 
homogeneous, then Lumpl, i.e. Goliaths, increases in size a little and we are back 
to square one. If the addition is heterogeneous, then Lumpl/Goliaths acquires an 
appendage: a lump of concrete attached where its nose used to be. There is a 
noseless statue with a concrete nose stuck on. In the second case, Goliaths 
remains again, this time no longer a statue. So Goliathp is interrupted. If the 
addition is homogeneous, and built up gradually, then perhaps this increases the 
size of Lumpl/Goliaths until it becomes a statue again and Goliathp resumes. If 
the addition is heterogeneous, then Lumpl/Goliaths remain as a non-statue and 
simply acquires a large concrete attachment. Again, we may think of the resulting 
composite as a ‘statue’; but it is no individual substance. 
 
                                                        
8 See my forthcoming for discussion of such ‘mere composites’. 
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§ 4 Activity, Change, and Colocation 
 
At this point the Exclusivist may go on the attack. How can there be distinct 
material substances precisely colocated at any time: isn’t it in the nature of such 
things to exclude each other from their precise location at all times? This is why 
two identical twins can never be colocated, for example, however closely they 
match in size and shape. The standard response to this intuitive challenge is to 
point out that, unlike identical twins, colocated substances share the same 
material for the duration of their colocation (e.g. Wiggins, 1968, 2001). But this 
simply serves to press the question what then distinguishes the two, especially 
since we have seen how the supposedly constituted substance may be identified 
without loss with the supposedly constituting substance that accidentally 
satisfies the relevant artifact kind predicate.9 
 
Fine (2008) argues that the only satisfactory account of their distinctness posits 
a difference in form as a non-material component of colocated substances.10 This 
is a powerful idea with an excellent pedigree. But I put it to one side here, along 
with other views on which distinctness is supposed to be extrinsic, historical, 
biological, or simply brute, in order to consider what seems to me to be the most 
promising anti-Exclusivist account that ironically also illuminates the case for 
Exclusivity in the domain of genuine substances.11 
                                                        
9 See e.g. Sosa (1987), Olson (2001), and Bennett (2004), for this challenge to 
ground the distinctness of colocated substances. 
10 See Koslicki (2008) for development of this Aristotelian view. 
11 See Baker (2000), Bennett (2004), and Crane (2012) for some other views of 
distinctness. The account that I consider has been developed over many years by 
Wiggins (1967, 1980, 2001, 2012) and is extended by Jones (2015). 
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What is it for there to be a persisting macroscopic material object over and above 
any fundamental simples that there may be; and why are there just those such 
things that there are rather than any counterintuitive ‘bazillionfold’ 
multiplication of them?12 The basic idea that I consider in what remains is that 
material objects are subjects of characteristic law-like activity and change, whose 
nature is given by these features rather than by any principle of composition 
from a unique plurality of simples.13 The activity and change in question are the 
activity characteristic of the kind of thing that the object is and the change that 
objects of that kind may survive, as opposed to change that destroys them. 
Individual objects are individual paths of such activity and change. Which such 
things there are depends on the laws governing such activity and change that 
actually obtain. 
 
This proposal is neutral as between genuine substances and the various 
individual processes grounded upon them that we have also been considering 
here.14 The dripping of a specific tap, for example, is an individual instance of a 
kind of persisting process – a tap’s dripping. As such, it involves characteristic 
activity and change. It makes a certain kind of sound that changes in timbre and 
pitch as the water heats up and the basin fills up, and it causes irritation to those 
in earshot. It survives some changes, in the frequency and regularity of the 
                                                        
12 See e.g. Sider (2013) for the nihilist extreme and Bennett (2004) for the 
‘plenitudinous’ extreme. All parties to the debate that I am considering here 
believe something in between. 
13 See Jones (2015) for an application of this idea as a solution to the Problem of 
the Many. 
14 This is why I use the term ‘object’, intended broadly, for the entities whose 
nature the current proposal seeks to elucidate. 
 20 
driping, for example; but is terminated by others, such as the tap’s being turned 
off completely or the water beginning to flow freely. 
 
Similarly, consider the process of Heston Blumenthal’s being a chef, HBp, as 
opposed to HBs, the man that cooked for me before he became a chef and is 
currently a very well known chef. HBp is again an individual instance of a kind of 
process, a person’s being a chef. As such, it involves characteristic activity and 
change. It may involve some chopping here, some shouting there, and some 
thinking about the correct proportions of various ingredients; it brings 
entertainment to those watching and delight to those eating. It survives 
movement from one restaurant to another and could even survive becoming 
one-handed – witness Michael Caines’ being a chef one-handedly. It was brought 
into existence by a great deal of learning and experience in the kitchen, and 
would plausibly be terminated by injury sufficient to prevent all cooking activity, 
or HB deciding to focus entirely on his violin playing and never cook again, for 
example. 
 
In just the same way, the Exclusivist will urge, Goliathp is an individual instance 
of a kind of process, a lump of clay’s being a statue, in this case, Lumpl’s being a 
statue. As such, it involves characteristic activity and change. It is brought into 
existence by the sculptor’s careful and deliberate shaping of Lumpl. It is the focus 
of a certain kind of critical-aesthetic evaluation and may be involved in various 
kinds of protection from damage and theft. It survives movement from museum 
to museum, but would be terminated by the sculptor squashing Lumpl back into 
a ball in dissatisfaction with her work. 
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So far as I can see, these are all persisting macroscopic material objects in the 
sense under consideration, every bit as much as HBs and Lumpl, whose 
characteristic activity and change are of course distinct from those of the various 
processes that are in this way grounded upon them. Furthermore, distinct 
material objects understood in this way may be precisely colocated. For example, 
HBp is colocated with HBs; and Goliathp is colocated with Goliaths.15 In all these 
cases, the relevant paths of characteristic activity and change precisely overlap. 
 
We have a model to understand this, to understand how there can be such 
colocated yet distinct material objects. This applies paradigmatically in the case 
of HBp and HBs; and the Exclusivist applies it equally in understanding the statue 
case. There is a single substance, HBs, that is accidentally a chef. The substantial 
chef is that man; but we may also consider the process of his being a chef, HBp. 
This is a distinct yet colocated persisting material object with its own 
characteristic activity and change grounded on HBs. Similarly, there is a single 
substance in the case of our statue, Goliaths=Lumpl, which is accidentally a 
statue; but we may also consider the process of its being a statue, Goliathp. This 
is a distinct yet colocated persisting material object with its own characteristic 
activity and change grounded on Lumpl.16 
 
                                                        
15 Indeed, HBp may be temporarily colocated with HBv too, the process of 
Heston’s being a violinist, during the period in which he is actively involved in 
both cooking and playing the violin in preparation for a permanent switch of 
career from the kitchen to the concert platform. 
16 We understand the colocation of HBp and HBv since both are colocated 
processes grounded on HBs that are temporarily concurrent. 
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The Exclusivist’s point so far is that this model is completely satisfactory as an 
explanation of the phenomena cited in opposition to Exclusivity in the domain of 
substances. Yet it is perfectly consistent with Exclusivity. Furthermore, the 
model depends upon the fact that at least one of the colocated material objects in 
question is a process grounded upon a more basic material object of which it is a 
specific kind of changing, or unchanging/remaining. So either this grounding 
terminates in a basic domain of Exclusive Individuals, or it is processes all the 
way down. The Exclusivist under consideration here may reasonably feel that 
the latter is unacceptable, since it is inconsistent with the commitment to the 
existence of substances as enduring material individuals. For, as Steward rightly 
insists against Stout, it is in the nature of process that they persist by perduring 
as a succession of unlfolding temporal parts.  
 
Put more directly, the argument is this. Both parties to the current debate accept 
that there are endurants, call them substances. Now suppose that Exclusivity 
fails in the domain of these substances. Then it follows from the model that we 
have before us, inspired by the Wigginsian account of what it is for there to be 
persisting macroscopic material objects at all, that at least one of any pair of 
colocated yet distinct substances is in fact a process grounded upon the other, or 
upon some more basic persisting object, of which it is a kind of 
unchanging/remaining. This individual therefore persists by perduring as a 
succession of temporal parts, and is therefore not an endurant at all. So we have 
a contradiction. It follows that the enduring substances satisfy Exclusivity. 
 
Thus we have a case for a rather traditional picture, on which Exclusive enduring 
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substances are the most basic macroscopic material subjects of activity and 
change. Of course it is open to opponents of Exclusivity to reconsider the idea of 
any genuinely enduring macroscopic material objects at all, and embrace the 
idea of potentially colocated processes all the way down. But the debate that I am 
concerned with here takes place between proponents of enduring material 
substances. So the Wigginsian model that I have been considering offers a 
motivation for precisely the Exclusivity within the domain of such substances 




Steward insists on two distinctions where others have seen just one: amongst 
the individuals that undergo change, between those that endure and those that 
occur; and amongst the individuals that occur, between those that undergo 
change and those that do not. This leaves us with three categories: substances, 
processes, and events. One may then choose to use the term continuant to 
include just the first, or the first and the second together. Not much hangs on the 
terminology, provided that both distinctions are respected. I endorse Helen’s 
diagrammatic representation of this situation in terms of varieties of abstraction 
in cases of change, or its absence in a particular respect; and I add my own 
suggestion that Exclusive Individuals lie at its grounding apex.17 
 
                                                        
17 I am grateful to the following for helpful comments on earlier versions of this 
material. Michael Ayers, Quassim Cassam, Jennifer Hornsby, Chris Hughes, Nick 
Jones, Rory Madden, Gonzalo Rodriguez Pereyra, Matt Soteriou, and David 
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